Abstract. We propose pure OMD (p-OMD) as a new variant of the Offset Merkle-Damgård (OMD) authenticated encryption scheme. Our new scheme inherits all desirable security features of OMD while having a more compact structure and providing higher efficiency. The original OMD scheme, as submitted to the CAESAR competition, couples a single pass of a variant of the Merkle-Damgård (MD) iteration with the counter-based XOR MAC algorithm to provide privacy and authenticity. Our improved p-OMD scheme dispenses with the XOR MAC algorithm and is purely based on the MD iteration; hence, the name "pure" OMD. To process a message of ℓ blocks and associated data of blocks, OMD needs ℓ + + 2 calls to the compression function while p-OMD only requires max {ℓ, } + 2 calls. Therefore, for a typical case where ℓ ≥ , p-OMD makes just ℓ + 2 calls to the compression function; that is, associated data is processed almost freely compared to OMD. We prove the security of p-OMD under the same standard assumption (pseudorandomness of the compression function) as made in OMD; moreover, the security bound for p-OMD is the same as that of OMD, showing that the modifications made to boost the performance are without any loss of security.
Introduction
An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme provides two complementary data security goals: confidentiality (privacy) and integrity (authenticity). Traditionally, these goals were achieved by combining two cryptographic primitives, a privacy-only encryption scheme and a message authentication code (MAC)-a paradigm known as generic composition (GC) [8, 9, 21] . The notion of AE, as a desirable symmetric-key primitive in its own right, was introduced in 2000 [8, 10, 19] . Since then, security notions for AE schemes have been defined and refined [15, 23, [25] [26] [27] , together with many dedicated AE designs seeking some advantages over the GC-based schemes.
AE schemes have been studied for over a decade, yet the topic remains a highly active and interesting area of research as evidenced by the currently running CAESAR competition [11] . OMD [13, 14] is one of 57 first-round CAESAR submissions, among which, at the time of writing this paper, 8 submissions are withdrawn due to major security flaws.
Among the features that OMD possesses, the following two are notably interesting and distinctive: OMD is the only CAESAR submission that is designed (as a mode of operation) based on a compression function [3] , and it provides (provably) high security levels (about twice that of the AES-based submissions) when implemented with an off-the-shelf compression function such as those of the standard SHA family [2] .
Instantiations of OMD using the compression functions of SHA-256 and SHA-512, called OMDsha256 and OMD-sha512 respectively, can freely benefit from the widely-deployed optimized implementations of these primitives, e.g. [16, 17] ; in particular, OMD-sha256 can take advantage of the new Intel SHA Extensions [18] .
Motivated by the aforementioned appealing features of OMD, we further investigate the possibility of making algorithmic improvements to the original OMD scheme towards boosting its efficiency, while preserving or even improving its security properties. We show that there is a natural way (inspired from the work of [28] ) to modify OMD to make it more compact and efficient with respect to processing associated data (AD). Our new variant of OMD-called pure OMD (p-OMD)-has the following features:
A correction. In the preproceedings version of this paper at FSE 2015, we claimed that (in addition to the efficiency advantage of pOMD compared to OMD which is the main contribution of this work) one also gets a partial level of robustness to nonce misuse with respect to the authenticity property. Tomer Ashur and Bart Mennink pointed out [4] that this claim was incorrect; that is, pOMD similar to OMD requires nonce respecting for providing security.
Organization of the paper. Notations and prelimiary concepts are presented in Section 2. Definitions of security notions for AE schemes are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 provides the specification of the p-OMD mode of operation. In Section 5, we provide the security analysis of p-OMD. Section 6 provides an experimental performance comparison between p-OMD and OMD.
Preliminaries
Notations. Let $ ← denote choosing an element from a finite set uniformly at random. ← is used for denoting the assignment statement where the value of is assigned to . All strings are binary strings. The empty string is denoted by . The set of all strings of length bits (for some positive integer ) is denoted as {0, 1} , the set of all strings whose lengths are upper-bounded by is denoted by {0, 1}
≤ and the set of all strings of finite length is denoted by {0, 1} * . The notations The special symbol ⊥ signifies both that the value of a variable or a function at some input is undefined, and an error. Let | | denote the number of elements of if is a set, and the length of in bits if is a string. We let | | = 0. For ∈ {0, 1} * let 1 || 2 · · · || ← denote partitioning into blocks such that | | = for 1 ≤ ≤ − 1 and | | ≤ ; let = | | denote length of in -bit blocks.
For a string
, let ≪ denote the left-shift operation, where the leftmost bits are discarded and the vacated right bits are set to 0. We let ≫ denote the (unsigned) right-shift operation where the rightmost bits are discarded and the vacated left bits are set to 0. We let ≫ denote the signed right-shift operation where the rightmost bits are discarded and the vacated left bits are filled with the original leftmost bit (which is considered as the sign bit); for example, 1001100 ≫ 3 = 1111001. If the leftmost bit of is 0 then we have ≫ = ≫ .
The Finite Field with 2 Elements. Let ( (2 ), ⊕, .) denote the Galois Field with 2 elements. An element in (2 ) is represented as a formal polynomial ( ) = −1 −1 + · · · + 1 + 0 with binary coefficients. We can assign an element ∈ (2 ) to an integer ∈ {0, . . . , 2 − 1} in a natural way, similar applies for and a string ∈ {0, 1} . We sometimes refer to the elements of (2 ) directly by strings or integers, if the context does not allow ambiguity. The addition "⊕" and multiplication "." of two field elements in (2 ) are defined as usual [14] . For (2 256 ) we use 256 ( ) = 256 + 10 + 5 + 2 + 1, and for (2 512 ) we use 512 ( ) = 512 + 8 + 5 + 2 + 1 as the irreducible polynomials used in the field multiplications. It is easy to multiply an arbitrary field element by the element 2 (i.e. ). For example, in (2 256 ) using 256 ( ) the doubling operation can be described as follows:
We note that the results computed in (1) and (2) are the same but an implementation using (2) will not be susceptible to the timing attacks unlike one which uses (1).
Advantage Function. The insecurity of a scheme in regard to a security property xxx is measured using the resource parametrized function Adv xxx (r) = {Adv xxx ( )}, where the maximum is taken over all adversaries which use resources bounded by r. Let be an adversary that returns a binary value; by (.) ( ) ⇒ 1 we refer to the event that on input and access to an oracle function (.) returns 1.
Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) and Tweakable PRFs. Let Func( , ) = { : {0, 1} → {0, 1} } be the set of all functions from -bit strings to -bit strings. A random function (RF) with -bit input and -bit output is a function selected uniformly at random from Func( , ). We denote this by $ ← Func( , ). Let Func ( , ) be the set of all functions
}︁
, where is a set of tweaks. A tweakable RF with the tweak space , -bit input and -bit output is a map̃︀ : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} selected uniformly at random from Func ( , ); i.e.̃︀ $ ← Func ( , ). Clearly, if = {0, 1} then |Func ( , )| = |Func( + , )|, and hence,̃︀ can be instantiated using a random function with ( + )-bit input and -bit output. We usẽ︀ ⟨ ⟩ (.) and̃︀( , .) interchangeably, for every ∈ . Notice that each tweak names a random functioñ︀ ⟨ ⟩ : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and distinct tweaks name distinct (independent) random functions. Let : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} be a keyed function and let̃︀ : × × {0, 1} → {0, 1} be a keyed and tweakable function, where the key space is some nonempty set. Let (.) = ( , .) and︀ ⟨ ⟩ (.) =̃︀( , , .) . Let be an adversary. Then:
The resource parametrized advantage functions are defined accordingly, considering that the adversarial resources of interest here are the time complexity ( ) of the adversary and the total number of queries ( ) asked by the adversary (note that we just consider fixed-input-length functions, so the lengths of queries are fixed and known). We say that is ( , ; )-PRF if Adv prf ( , ) ≤ . We say that︀ is ( , ; )-tweakable PRF if Adṽ︁ prf︀ ( , ) ≤ .
Security Notions for AEAD
Syntax of an AEAD Scheme. A nonce-based authenticated encryption with associated data, AEAD for short, is a symmetric key scheme = ( , ℰ, ). The key space is some non-empty finite set. The encryption algorithm ℰ : × × × ℳ → ∪ {⊥} takes four arguments, a secret key ∈ , a nonce ∈ , an associated data (a.k.a. header data) ∈ and a message ∈ ℳ, and returns either a ciphertext C ∈ or a special symbol ⊥ indicating an error. The decryption algorithm : × × × → ℳ ∪ {⊥} takes four arguments ( , , , C) and either outputs a message ∈ ℳ or an error indicator ⊥.
For correctness of the scheme, it is required that ( , , , C) = for any C such that C = ℰ( , , , ). It is also assumed that if algorithms ℰ and receive parameter not belonging to their specified domain of arguments they will output ⊥. We write ℰ ( , , ) = ℰ( , , , ) and similarly ( , , C) = ( , , , C). We assume that the message and associated data can be any binary string of arbitrary but finite length; i.e. ℳ = {0, 1} * and = {0, 1} * , but the key and nonce are some fixed-length binary strings,
i.e. = {0, 1} | | and = {0, 1} , where the positive integers | | and are respectively the nonce length and the key length of the scheme in bits. We assume that |ℰ ( , , )| = | | + for some positive fixed constant ; that is, we will have C = ||Tag where | | = | | and |Tag| = . We call the core ciphertext and Tag the tag.
Nonce Respecting Adversaries. Let be an adversary. We say that is nonce-respecting if it never repeats a nonce in its encryption queries. That is, if queries the encryption oracle ℰ (·, ·, ·) on
Privacy Notion. We adopt the privacy notion called indistinguishability of ciphertext from random bits under CPA (IND$-CPA), which is defined in [26] as a stronger variant of the classical IND-CPA notion [5, 8] . Let = ( , ℰ, ) be a nonce-based AEAD scheme. Let be a nonce-respecting adversary. is provided with an oracle which can be either a real encryption oracle ℰ (·, ·, ·) such that on input ( , , ) returns C = ℰ ( , , ), or a fake encryption oracle $(·, ·, ·) which on any input ( , , ) returns |C| fresh random bits. The advantage of in mounting a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) against the privacy property of is measured as follows:
Authenticity Notion. We adopt the established notion of authenticity, called integrity of ciphertext (INT-CTXT) under CCA attacks. The notion was originally defined in [8] for AE schemes and later revisited to include (authentication of AD in) AEAD schemes in [23] . Let = ( , ℰ, ) be a nonce-based AEAD scheme. Let be a nonce-respecting adversary. We stress that nonce-respecting is only regarded for the encryption queries; that is, can repeat nonces during its decryption queries and it can also ask an encryption query with a nonce that was already used in a decryption query. Let be provided with the encryption oracle ℰ (·, ·, ·) and the decryption oracle (·, ·, ·); that is, we consider adversaries that can mount chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). We say that forges if it makes a decryption query ( , , C) such that ( , , C) ̸ = ⊥ and no previous encryption query ℰ ( , , ) returned C.
Resource parameters. Let an adversary make encryption queries
, where is the time complexity, and are respectively the total number of encryption queries and decryption queries, is the maximum length of each query in bits, =
The absence of a resource parameter will mean that the parameter is irrelevant in the context and hence omitted.
The p-OMD Mode of Operation
p-OMD is a mode of operation that converts a keyed compression function to an AEAD scheme. To instantiate p-OMD, one must first choose and fix a keyed compression function : ×({0, 1} × {0, 1} ) → {0, 1} and a tag length ≤ ; with the key space = {0, 1} and ≤ . Let p-OMD[ , ] denote the p-OMD instantiated by fixing and .
If the compression function at hand does not have a dedicated key input per se, as it is the case for standard hash functions, then a keyed compression function with + input bits can be obtained from the keyless compression function with + input bits by allocating input bits for the key, such that = + . For example, if we use the compression function of SHA-256, we have = 256, = 512 and setting = 256 will give us a keyed compression function with = = 256.
Description of the Mode. The main design rationale behind p-OMD is the integration of AD processing into the same MD path that processes the message. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the encryption algorithm of p-OMD [ , ] . The decryption algorithm can be straightforwardly derived from the encryption algorithm with the additional verification of the authentication tag at the end of the decryption process. While the overall structure of such design is rather simple, the combined processing of the message and associated data blocks in p-OMD creates several additional possible cases, to be treated and analyzed carefully, compared to the analysis of OMD. Figure 2 provides an algorithmic description.
In the following we briefly explain the components that may need further clarification.
(1) Computing , , . As shown in Figure 1 , before each call to the underlying compression function , we xor a (key-dependent) masking value , , to the chaining variable, where is the nonce, the component of the index is incremented at each call to the compression function and the component is changed when needed (according to a pattern that will be detailed shortly). This method is known as the method [24] and is used for converting to a tweakable function. There are different plausible ways to compute such masking values (under efficiency and security constraints) [12, 20, 24] . We adopt the Gray code based method following [20] . In the following, all multiplications (denoted by "·") are in (2 ) .
(a) Precomputation. Let * (0) = 0 , * (1) = (0 , 0 ) and * ( ) = · * (1) for 2 ≤ ≤ 15. Let (0) = 16 · * (1) and ( ) = 2 · ( − 1) for ≥ 1. For a fast implementation the values * ( )
Case B:ℓ > 0 and
Case C:ℓ > 0 and
Obtaining the final tag. 
For details on how we get this compact relation adopting the Gray code based sequence partition method, we refer to Appendix A.
1: Algorithm Precompute( ) 2:
for ← 2 to 15 do 5:
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49: Figure 1 and the case when we only have a message and no AD that is not in the Figure) . stage 3 processes only double blocks of AD (Cases C and D in Figure 1 ). Note that the Cases E and F are handled outside of the three stages. Subroutines PARTITION, PAD, SWITCH and PROC1-3 are described in Figure 3 .
(2) Encryption Algorithm: To encrypt a message ∈ {0, 1} * with associated data ∈ {0, 1} * using nonce ∈ {0, 1} | | and key ∈ {0, 1} , obtaining a ciphertext C = ||Tag ∈ {0, 1} | |+ , do the following.
(a) Partitioning the message and associated data. The partitioning is done by the PAR-TITION subroutine in Figure 3 .
The string ′ consists of ′ ≤ ℓ + 1 -bit blocks and these blocks will be simply absorbed into the chaining variable during the message encryption. In a typical use case where the associated data is (a header) shorter than the message, we will have ′ = i.e. * = (Case A and Case B in Figure 1 ). The string * will be non-empty only if | | > (ℓ + 1) , in which case, while * is being processed, there are no more message blocks to encrypt. To maximize the efficiency, we partition the string * into + -bit blocks so that we can make use of both of the inputs to (see Case C and Case D in Figure 1 ). (b) Processing the message and associated data. The message and associated data blocks are processed by the modified MD iteration of the keyed compression functions as shown in Figure 1 . For every call to , the -bit input (chaining variable) is masked by the value , , ; where, the component in the index denotes the nonce; starts with the value = 1 at the first call to and is incremented (by one) for every call; the component is used to separate logical parts in the encryption process as well as different types of input arguments. Appropriate use of the component is essential for security and facilitates the analysis, as will be described in the following.
1: Subroutine PARTITION( , ) 2:
7: 
14:
else 15:
3:
stop ← min{ℓ, ′ }
3:
for ← to stop do 4:
7:
for ← to ℓ do 3:
for ← 1 to * do 3:
4:
5:
← ⊕ Left
6:
← ⊕ (ntz( + − 1)) 7:
8: We use different values of to separate the calls to the masked in different contexts. Let's classify the calls to the masked to two types: (1) the final call to which returns the tag, and (2) the internal calls. We note that in the special case that = and | | ≤ there will be only one call to which returns the tag; hence, it is considered as the final call. Internal Calls. We use ∈ {0, 1, 2} for the internal calls made to the masked as follows. For = 1, i.e. the first call to , the value of is determined as follows: * if ℓ > 0 and ′ > 0 then let = 0, * if ℓ > 0 and ′ = 0 then let = 1, * if ℓ = 0 and * > 0 then let = 2. For 1 < < ℓ + 1 + * , depending on the presence of message blocks and AD blocks to be processed at the th call to the masked , we have:
* if both an -bit AD block and an -bit message block are present then = 0, * if only an -bit message block is present (no AD block is processed) then = 1, * if only an ( + )-bit AD block is present (no message block is processed) then = 2. Final Call. The final call to which produces the authentication tag uses ∈ {3, 4, 5, . . . , 14, 15}.
If the tag is produced by a call to with ̸ = 1, we have three main cases depending on the inputs to the final masked . Note that there is no variable in Figure 2 as corresponds to a special use of variable in the last call to . Specifically, corresponds to the calls to the SWITCH subroutine that use the value of new of the form const + + or the value 3. (4) Decryption Algorithm: The decryption algorithm accepts a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * together with associated data ∈ {0, 1} * and nonce ∈ {0, 1} | | , and using key ∈ {0, 1} obtains a plaintext ∈ {0, 1} * or returns an invalid indication ⊥. If |C| < then return ⊥. Otherwise let be the first |C| − bits of C and Tag be the remaining bits. Now, considering that the encryption process of p-OMD is actually an additive stream cipher with an integrated authentication mechanism, the decryption process proceeds the same as the encryption process up until the verification of the tag, which happens at the end of the decryption process where the newly computed tag Tag ′ is compared with the provided tag Tag. If Tag ′ = Tag then output , otherwise output ⊥.
Security Analysis
The security analysis for p-OMD is modular and easy to follow. The high-level structure of the analysis is similar to that of OMD, as expected from the similarities of the algorithms, though the details differ and are more involved. The proof is divided into three main steps as follows:
Step 1: Idealization of the p-OMD scheme using a tweakable random function. We first analyse the security of a generalized variant of p-OMD [ , ] where the "masked " (aimed to instantiate a tweakable function) is replaced by an ideal primitive; namely, a tweakable random functioñ︀. This generalized scheme is called p-OMD[̃︀, ] and illustrated in Figure 4 . This is the major proof step which differs from and is more involved than that of OMD.
Step 2: Realization of the tweakable random function by a tweakble PRF. This is a well-known classical method where the (ideal) random function is replaced by a PRF. This proof step is therefore the same as that of OMD.
Step 3: Instantiation of the tweakable PRF via a PRF. To make a tweakable PRF out of a PRF, we use the XE method of [24] with the masking sequence generated based on an appropriate adjustment of a canonical Gray code sequence [20, 26] . This step is similar to that of OMD; only the details of the mask generation function differ.
The security bound for p-OMD is given by Theorem 1. It is interesting to note that the security bound is the same as that of OMD, showing that the natural modifications we made to OMD to obtain p-OMD are without any loss of security. Figure 4 . Then Proof. The proof of the privacy bound is straightforward. Let be a CPA adversary that asks (encryption) queries
Idealization of p-OMD

Lemma 1. Let p-OMD[̃︀, ] be the scheme shown in
where all values (for 1 ≤ ≤ ) are distinct due to the nonce-respecting assumption on the adversary . Referring to Figure 4 , this means that we are
Case B: ℓ > 0 and |A| n < ℓ + 1.
Case C: ℓ > 0 and |A| n > ℓ + 1. Case E: M = ε and 0 < |A| ≤ n. LetĀ applying independent random functions̃︀ , , each to a single input value, hence the images that the adversary sees (i.e. C for 1 ≤ ≤ ) are fresh uniformly random values.
The proof of the authenticity bound is a rather involved case analysis. A visualisation of the hierarchy of the cases as a tree is presented in Figure 5 to improve clarity of the proof. We first analyse the case where the adversary makes a single verification query and then we will use the generic result of Bellare et al. [6] (i.e. use hybrids to get rid of decryption queries one by one) to get a bound against adversaries that make multiple verification queries.
Let be a single-verification-query adversary that is making encryption queries
). Let = 1 · · · ℓ be the message and = ′ 1 · · · ′ ′ || * 1 · · · * * be the associated data in the th encryption query. Let C = ||Tag be the ciphertext received for query ( , , ). That is, we use superscripts to indicate query numbers and subscripts to denote the block indices in each query. We further let = 1 + ℓ + * . Note that is the number of calls to the compression function made while processing the th query and also the value of the second tweak component used in the final call to the compression function which produces Tag .
Let ( , , C) be the forgery attempt by the adversary, where
is the associated data, C = ||Tag is the ciphertext where = 1 · · · ℓ and Tag ∈ {0, 1} is the tag. Let = 1 · · · ℓ denote the corresponding decrypted message. We let = 1 + ℓ + * be the number of calls to made while processing the forgery attempt (which is the same as the value of the second tweak component in the final call to the compression function that is supposed to produce the Tag). Note that no superscripts are used for the strings in the alleged forgery by the adversary.
In the proof, we refer to the intermediate chaining variables that occur in the query processing, namely let denote the output of the th call to the compression function in the processing of the th encryption query, so we have
Similarly, we let stand for th intermediate chaining value in the processing of the forgery attempt.
Case1 Case2
Case4.1 Case4.2 Case4.3
All cases
Remaining case We have the following disjoint cases.
in the following. The adversary has to find a correct Tag that is the first bits of a value produced bỹ︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.).
Because the nonce-component of the tweak ⟨ , , ⟩ has not been used in any encryption query, has not seen any image under̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.) (for any values of and ). Thus the probability that the adversary can succeed in finding correct value of Tag is 2 − .
In all the following cases we haveĒ 1 , i.e. = for a single ∈ {1, . . . , } (noticing that no nonce is reused during encryption queries). We can ignore all queries other than the th query since the responses to such queries are random and independent (because of using different nonces) to the adversary's task to make the forgery attempt , , C with = .
Case 2:Ē 1 ∧ E 2 , where E 2 is the event that ̸ = . Recall that a successfully forged Tag must be the first bits of a value produced bỹ︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.). The inequality ̸ = occurring in this case implies that̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.) is a fresh RF and the adversary has not seen any image under it (no matter what are the values of and ) and the adversary has to guess the correct Tag. The probability of a successful forgery is therefore 2 − .
We need to introduce some auxiliary notation for the analysis of the following cases. Consider the th encryption query. Depending on the length of the message | | and the length of AD | |, we can have three situations. In the first situation, we have | | + 1 = | | and | | > 0 (Case A in Figure  4 ). This means that the compression function call used to produce Tag has a block of message at its -bit input and an AD block xored to the chaining variable at its -bit input. We denote this event as type-1 and we note that ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. The second possible situation arises if Figure 4 ). There is no block of the AD xored to the -bit input of the final compression function call. We denote this event as type-2 and we note that ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11}. The last possible situation is when either | | + 1 < | | and | | > so there is a block of AD xored to the -bit input as well as another block fed directly to the -bit input in the final call to the compression function (Cases C, D in Figure 4 ) or 0 < | | ≤ and = (Case E in Figure 4 ). We denote this by type-3 and we note that ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15}. We define type-1, type-2 and type-3 for the forgery attempt in a similar way (note that | | = | |).
In the following, we need to address the eventĒ 1 ∧Ē 2 i.e. = , = . We remark that the condition E 2 is met for a valid forgery (i.e. ( , ) ̸ = ( , )) if and only if both the th encryption query and the alleged forgery are
(we pad the last block of iff we pad the last block of and the same applies for associated data), -of the same "type", i.e.
Case 3:Ē 1 ∧Ē 2 ∧ E 3 where E 3 stands for the event that ̸ = . Recall that Tag is produced as the most significant bits of an image under̃︀ 
⟩︀
(.) for some and Tag is produced similarly, as the most significant bits of an image under̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.) for some . We have two sub-cases.
Case 3a:
If > then has seen no image under̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.) regardless of the value of and the probability of a successful forgery (equivalent to guessing random bits) is 2 − . Case3b: If < then a single image under̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ was used in processing of the th encryption query. However Tag is produced by a fresh RF̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ (.), because we always have ̸ = (because of the rules of selecting the tweak component). The probability of a successful forgery (equivalent to guessing random bits) is 2 − . Case 4: It remains to address the cases, where we haveĒ 1 ∧Ē 2 ∧Ē 3 , i.e. the case, when the ℎ encryption query and the alleged forgery (1) share the same nonce, (2) are padded in the same way, are both non-empty, are of the same "type" so = and (3) they are both processed with the same number of calls to the compression function. We investigate each of the three possible "types" separately. . This means that ′ = ℓ + 1 = = = ′ = ℓ + 1, * = 0 and * = 0. Both Tag and Tag are produced by the same RF̃︀ ⟨ , ,4⟩ (.). W.l.o.g. assume that both | ′ | and | ′ | are a multiple of and both | | and | | are a multiple of . We can make this assumption because in the other cases the incomplete blocks are injectively padded to full length (and because of the conditionĒ 2 ). This means that if two strings are unequal before being padded will also be unequal after the padding, e.g. Figure 4 ). After that point the security analysis is almost identical with what follows. The adversary can succeed in producing a valid forgery in two ways. Either the inputs into the last RF in the processing of the th encryption query and the inputs into the last RF in the processing of the forgery attempt are distinct, i.e.
In the former case, the adversary is left with the task of guessing the output value of a RF on an input, that has not been evaluated before which is bounded with the probability = 2 − . In the latter case, the equality (
), so there is a position in which the two queries differ, i.e. we must have an 1 ≤ < , such that ( ′ , ) ̸ = ( ′ , ) and after which the queries are identical. So has not seen the image RF =̃︀ ⟨ , , ⟩ ( −1 ⊕ ′ , ) but he must ensure that = . This happens with a probability of 2 − . We bound the total probability of observe, that the adversary's chance to produce a forgery is bounded by 2 − if the inputs to the final RF are distinct. The adversary can reuse Tag if he manages to force the collision on the inputs to the final RF. The probability that can succeed in forcing this collision is bounded in the same way as in Case 4.1 by summing 2 − for 1 ≤ < . For > ′ we have no more blocks of ′ to consider, which in fact gives the adversary even less power. We conclude that the probability of forgery in this case is bounded by 2 − + ( − 1)2 − . Case 4.2b: | | ̸ = | | , i.e. ′ ̸ = ′ . The analysis of this case is very similar to the previous one.
The difference lies in the fact, that we need to consider, that if ′ > ′ then there is at least one , such that 1 ≤ < and there is a block ′ but there is no block ′ (or the other way around if ′ < ′ ).This implies that two independent RFs̃︀ ⟨ , ,0⟩ (.) and̃︀ ⟨ , ,1⟩ (.) are applied in the th call (this is ensured by the rules of selecting the value of the last tweak component in the internal calls). Keeping this in mind, the analysis of this case follows the same structure as the previous case and we conclude that the probability of forgery is bounded by 2 − + ( − 1)2 − with the difference that for > ℓ + 1 we have no more blocks of to consider but we have + blocks of AD instead. The probability of inner collisions = for > ℓ + 1 is thus also 2 − and we conclude that the probability of forgery is bounded by 2 − + ( − 1)2 − . Case 4.3c: | | ̸ = | | , i.e. ℓ ̸ = ℓ and * ̸ = * . Similarly as in Case 4.2b we need to take into account that the adversary can change the length of message and AD, so that there must be such that 1 ≤ < and such that there is but no (or the other way around). The separation of the tweaks again ensures that the probability of internal collision is 2 − for such . We conclude that the probability of forgery is bounded by 2 − + ( − 1)2 − Finally, using the results of Bellare et al. [6] we get the bound against adversaries that make decryption (verification) queries with length limited by ℓ as 2 + ℓ 2 .
Realization of Tweakable RFs with Tweakable PRFs
This is a classical step in which the ideal primitive-tweakable random functioñ︀-is replaced with a standard primitive-tweakable PRF̃︀. The security loss induced by this step is stated in the following lemma. where the probabilities are taken over random selection of the key. As shown in Appendix A, it can be easily verified that these two properties are satisfied by the specific mask generation scheme of p-OMD, as described in Section 4.
Lemma 3. Let
: × ({0, 1} × {0, 1} ) → {0, 1} be a function family with key space . Let︀ : × × ({0, 1} × {0, 1} ) → {0, 1} be defined bỹ︀ ⟨ ⟩ ( , ) = (( ⊕ ( )), ) for every ∈ , ∈ , ∈ {0, 1} , ∈ {0, 1} 
Performance Comparison with OMD
To verify the performance advantage of p-OMD over OMD, with respect to processing associated data, we implemented the two algorithms in software and made some measurements to determine and compare their performance. The comparison is performed on the x86-64 architecture (Intel Core i7-3632QM, with all measurements carried out on a single core). For OMD, we used the OMD-sha512 instantiation optimised for the AVX1 instruction extension, which achieves the best result according to the CAESAR benchmarking measurements [1] . We made the necessary modifications (as in description of p-OMD) to the same code to obtain our implementation of p-OMD. Both OMD and p-OMD were instantiated with the same parameters: key length=512, nonce length=256, tag length=256. Both implementations have been built using the gcc compiler and setting the -Ofast optimization flag.
We measure the time complexity of the encryption process for varying lengths of message and associated data. For the sake of this section, let denote the message length and the AD length in bytes. We measure the encryption time for ∈ {64, 128, 192, . . . , 4096} and ∈ {64, 128, . . . } for every value of . That is, we consider the typical case when AD is at most as long as the message.
For both OMD and p-OMD and for every pair of values , , we measure the time of one encryption using the rdtsc instruction 200 times to compute the mean time. This is repeated 91 times and the value we take as the result is the median of these 91 mean encryption times. We additionally apply the same procedure to measure time complexity of the encryption of OMD with ∈ {64, 128, . . . , 4096} and = 0. The results are shown in Figure 7 .
The top left graph in Figure 7 shows that the relative complexity of encryption of both OMD and p-OMD decreases as the length of AD increases; however, p-OMD performs better than OMD. The top right graph demonstrates that if the length of AD is close to the message length then p-OMD has a clear advantage over OMD. The bottom right graph confirms that the p-OMD provides an almost free authentication of associated data compared to OMD. For both OMD and p-OMD, these measurements exclude the complexity of the precomputation step in computing , , (see Section 4) which is done only once during the whole lifetime of a key. As an upper bound, we measure the complexity of the precomputation step that is sufficient to encrypt messages with length up to 2 63 blocks. For OMD the precomputation step takes 5818 cycles while in p-OMD it requires 6863 cycles on average.
